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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Keith Allison was a tutor at an elementary school in Green Local School 
District in Wayne County, Ohio.  By all accounts, he was a high-performing 
 
* Ph.D., Clinical Associate Professor, Education Policy and Leadership, Annette 
Caldwell School of Education and Human Development, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity, Dallas, Texas.  I would like to acknowledge Laura Gilcrease, a Doctoral Candi-
date at SMU Simmons, who designed the flow chart that appears on page 90.  Also, 
thanks to my valued colleague, Dr. Gail Hartin, at SMU for being an early reader and 
editor on this project.  Finally, a huge thanks to Editor in Chief Bradley Craigmyle 
and his outstanding team, whose input and editorial guidance were invaluable in this 
process. 
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employee, earning the best ranking possible on his end-of-year evaluation.1  
On August 19, 2014, as he was preparing for his second year as a tutor, he 
was summoned to meet with his principal and superintendent.2  During the 
meeting, he was questioned about a recent post on his Facebook page that 
featured a photograph of calves confined in small crates on a local dairy 
farm.3  Accompanying the photos, Allison had written a brief message criti-
cizing the treatment of the calves and advocating for plant-based milks.4  His 
superintendent advised him that there were a large number of dairy farmers in 
Wayne County and that teachers should not offend this constituency.5  Alli-
son was told that his contract had not been renewed and that he could work 
the remainder of the week, but at a reduced compensation level.6  He filed 
suit with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union and People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals.7  The school district eventually settled for 
back pay and legal expenses and reinstated Allison as a middle school tutor.8 
Keith Allison’s story is hardly unique.  Many educators have found their 
careers interrupted due to seemingly innocuous online expression.  In 2009, a 
high school teacher in Winder, Georgia, was forced to resign after school 
officials became aware of Facebook pictures from her European vacation that 
showed her holding wine and beer, even though she had not given students 
access to her page.9  In 2012, a Manhattan school counselor was fired days 
short of gaining tenure after online photographs surfaced from her previous 
career as a lingerie model twenty years earlier.10  In 2013, a girls basketball 
coach in Pocatella, Idaho, was fired after posting an “immoral” vacation pic-
ture that showed her in a swimsuit with her fiancé, who had his hand resting 
on her bikini top.11  
 1. Complaint at 4, Allison v. Bd. of Educ. of Green Local Sch. Dist., No. 5:15-
cv-00416 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 5. 
 6. Id. at 6. 
 7. Eric Heisig, Teacher Settles Lawsuit Against Wayne County School District 
over Facebook Posts Touting Veganism, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 14, 2015, 11:10 
AM), http://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/index.ssf/2015/04/teacher_settles_lawsuit_agains.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Georgia Teacher’s Lawsuit over Facebook Firing Continues, LEGALZOOM 
(Sept. 7, 2015), http://blog.legalzoom.com/privacy/georgia-teachers-lawsuit-over-
facebook-firing-continues/. 
 10. Susan Edelman, Manhattan HS Guidance Counselor Stripped of Job over 
Steamy-Photo Past, N.Y. POST (Oct. 7, 2012, 4:00 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2012/10/07/manhattan-hs-guidance-counselor-stripped-of-job-over-
steamy-photo-past/. 
 11. Katie Kindelan, Idaho High School Coach Fired for “Immoral” Facebook 
Photo, ABC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/11/idaho-high-school-coach-fired-for-
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Public educators’ social media posts, however, are not always innocu-
ous.  In some cases, an individual’s social media speech may clearly provide 
evidence of a lack of fitness as an educator.  Karen Fitzgibbons, a fourth 
grade teacher in the small west Texas district of Frenship, was terminated 
after she advocated through Facebook for the return of racial segregation.12  
Her post came in the wake of a Dallas area pool party at which a police of-
ficer was captured on video wrestling a teenage African-American girl to the 
ground and then pulling his weapon on a group of young African-American 
bystanders.13  Upset over the subsequent resignation of the officer involved, 
Fitzgibbons blamed both the African-American children and their parents: 
I guess that’s what happens when you flunk out of school and have no 
education.  I’m sure their parents are just as guilty for not knowing 
what their kids were doing; or knew it and didn’t care.  I’m almost to 
the point of wanting them all segregated on one side of town so they 
can hurt each other and leave the innocent people alone . . . .14 
In the 1968 case Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
officially extended conditional First Amendment free speech rights to public 
educators.15  Pickering established that public employees have First Amend-
ment rights as citizens to comment on matters of “public concern”; however, 
those rights must be balanced against the State’s rights as an employer to 
efficiently manage the public services it provides.16  In 1982, the Court nar-
rowed the scope of public employee speech rights in Connick v. Myers, hold-
ing employee speech that addresses “private interests” does not merit First 
Amendment protection.17  As of early 2017, the Court had not yet heard a 
case dealing with the social media expression of a public employee.18  With 
 
immoral-facebook-photo/.  A state grievance panel later overturned the termination.  
Jimmy Hancock, Grievance Panel: Fired Pocatello High School Girls’ Basketball 
Coach Should Get Job Back, IDAHO ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://idahostatejournal.com/members/grievance-panel-fired-pocatello-high-school-
girls-basketball-coach-should/article_3c9ec8b6-6c40-11e3-99aa-0019bb2963f4.html. 
 12. Sophia Tesfaye, “I’m Almost to the Point of Wanting Them All Segregated”: 




 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 16. Id. at 568. 
 17. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 18. With social media use ubiquitous throughout society, it seems inevitable that 
a case involving the social media expression of a public employee will eventually 
reach the Supreme Court.  The Court has ruled in one case involving a police officer 
who made, starred in, and marketed police-themed pornography online.  See City of 
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam); see discussion infra Part II.B. 
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no clear Supreme Court precedent, legal scholars have voiced concern that 
the public concern/private interest distinction in Connick could allow courts 
to unnecessarily limit teachers’ rights regarding online expressive activity, 
even when that speech has no negative impact on the school environment.19 
How can public school administrators reach legally and ethically defen-
sible decisions in cases as widely divergent as Keith Allison and Karen Fitz-
gibbons?  How can they protect the efficacy of their school systems while 
still respecting the First Amendment rights of their employees?  When can 
they take adverse employment action against educators on the basis of speech 
that is posted online, and under what circumstances is that speech protected?  
Does the Connick public concern requirement effectively remove all constitu-
tional protection from public educators who are active on social media, irre-
spective of whether their speech is disruptive?  This Article addresses these 
questions by examining the developing law regarding the free speech rights 
of public employees, with a focus on how the Connick public concern/private 
interest dichotomy has been applied to social media and other electronic 
speech.  Part II reviews Supreme Court precedent, from Pickering and Con-
nick through the Court’s post-Connick decisions.  Part III highlights circuit 
conflict and scholarly criticism associated with the public concern/private 
interest question introduced in Connick.  Part IV analyzes recent federal cases 
dealing specifically with online speech of public employees.  Finally, Part V 
concludes by proposing an analytical framework designed to enable school 
administrators to make legally defensible decisions that both protect institu-
tional efficacy and advance public educators’ First Amendment free speech 
rights. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT 
On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has issued guidance on the 
issue of public employees and their First Amendment speech rights.  This 
section will provide a review of that precedent in the following manner.  
First, it examines the two Court decisions that have provided the essential 
framework for examining the free speech claims of public employees over the 
last four decades: Pickering v. Board of Education20 and Connick v. Myers.21  
Second, it focuses on the Court’s subsequent attempts to apply the principles 
from Pickering and Connick. 
 
 19. See D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free 
Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255–56 (1990); 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amend-
ment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1630–31 (2012); Patricia Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering 
with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can School Boards Restrict What Educators 
Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 118–19 (2010); 
Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on 
Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 149–50 (2012). 
 20. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563. 
 21. Connick, 461 U.S. 138. 
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A.  Pickering and Connick 
Walter Pickering was a public high school teacher who wrote to the edi-
tor of a local paper a letter that contained criticism of the school board’s use 
of funds from a 1961 bond election.22  He also suggested in his letter that the 
superintendent had used heavy-handed tactics to coerce teacher support of a 
failed referendum.23  The school board, concluding that Pickering’s claims 
were false and brought into question their “motives, honesty, integrity, truth-
fulness, responsibility and competence,” terminated Pickering’s employ-
ment.24  Pickering challenged the action, alleging that it was illegal retaliation 
for the exercise of his First Amendment speech rights.25 
The Court agreed.  Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
sought to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of “the teacher, as a 
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern” and the “State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”26  In order for protected speech to justify a public 
school teacher’s dismissal, Justice Marshall argued, the employer would have 
to demonstrate that the employee’s expression somehow interfered with 
school operations, impeded the employee’s ability to perform his job duties, 
or constituted a willful or reckless false statement.27  As examples of expres-
sive activities that might present permissible grounds for termination, Justice 
Marshall specifically cited speech that breached confidentiality or under-
mined superior/subordinate relationships.28  Justice Marshall also reasoned 
that a public educator might sometimes engage in expression “so without 
foundation that it calls into question his fitness to perform his duties in the 
classroom.”29 
In applying its balancing test, the Court concluded there was no reason 
to believe Pickering’s letter disrupted school district business or damaged his 
ability to effectively function as a teacher.30  Although the board members 
had alleged that the letter had a deleterious effect on their professional reputa-
tions, no evidence supporting these allegations had been introduced at trial.31  
In fact, with the exception of the board members themselves, most in the 
community had greeted Pickering’s letter with “massive apathy and total 
disbelief.”32  Pickering did not report directly to or even regularly interact 
 
 22. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 567. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 568. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 570 n.3. 
 29. Id. at 573 n.5. 
 30. Id. at 570–71. 
 31. Id. at 570. 
 32. Id. 
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with board members or the superintendent, so his speech did not interfere 
with working relationships.33  In fact, though the letter may have upset the 
superintendent and board members, the majority found that it was inconse-
quential to Pickering’s ability to perform his job or to the functioning of the 
school system in general.34 
Fewer than fifteen years after granting limited First Amendment rights 
to public employees, the Court held that not all public employee expressive 
activities merit First Amendment protection.35  Connick v. Myers arose out of 
an employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s office.36  Sheila Myers 
was an assistant district attorney in New Orleans when, in the fall of 1980, 
she was informed by her boss, District Attorney Harry Connick, that she was 
being transferred to another division of the criminal court.37  Rather than ac-
cept her transfer quietly, Myers prepared and distributed a survey to approx-
imately fifteen other assistant district attorneys, soliciting input on a variety 
of topics, including office morale, confidence in supervisors, and whether 
there should be an official “grievance committee.”38  Additionally, she ques-
tioned her colleagues about whether they had ever felt pressured to work on 
political campaigns.39 
Upon learning that Myers had distributed the survey, which was termed 
a “mini-insurrection” by another member of the office, Connick informed 
Myers that she was terminated as a result of her failure to accept her trans-
fer.40  Myers filed suit against Connick, claiming that the termination was in 
retaliation for her exercise of protected speech under the First Amendment.41  
Applying Pickering, the district court held in favor of Myers, ordering rein-
statement, as well as back pay and damages.42  Although Connick claimed 
that Myers’s refusal to accept the transfer was the reason for her termination, 
the district court viewed this as pretext and suggested that the real reason for 
her termination was the distribution of the office survey.43  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.44 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.  The Court distinguished My-
ers’s survey from Pickering’s letter, suggesting the survey addressed matters 
almost exclusively of private interest.45  Employee speech that does not ad-
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 36. Id. at 140. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 141. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 142. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 146. 
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dress a matter of public concern should be beyond judicial oversight.46  If 
employee speech can fairly be characterized as pertaining to a matter of per-
sonal or private concern, employers should enjoy broad latitude to reach neg-
ative employment decisions without the courts second-guessing them. 
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern,” 
the Court explained, “must be determined by the content, form, and context 
of a given statement.”47  In examining the content of Myers’s speech, the 
Court concluded that only one question on her survey – the one dealing with 
pressure to support certain political candidates – dealt with a public con-
cern.48  Regarding form and context, the Court focused on Myers’s motiva-
tion in distributing the survey, which it viewed as purely self-serving.49  
“Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney’s Office 
was not discharging its government responsibilities in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal cases,” wrote Justice White, “nor did Myers seek to 
bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the 
part of Connick and others.”50  The primary purpose of the survey, the Court 
suggested, was to “gather ammunition for another round of controversy with 
her superiors.”51 
The Court’s verbiage was narrow, qualifying its holding as establishing 
that: 
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of pub-
lic concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not 
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employ-
ee’s behavior.52 
The test became a “threshold question” through which all public employee 
expression must pass before advancing to balancing under Pickering.53  Tak-
en together, Pickering and Connick provide that the First Amendment pro-
tects public educators only when they speak as citizens on matters of public 
concern and to the extent that the speech does not interfere with school opera-
tions or employee effectiveness. 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 147–48. 
 48. Id. at 148. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 150. 
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B.  The Post-Connick Era 
In the post-Connick era, the Court has sent somewhat mixed messages 
regarding the public concern requirement articulated in Connick.  In 1984, the 
Court denied certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River School District, thus allow-
ing a troubling Sixth Circuit decision to stand.54  In Rowland, a guidance 
counselor at Stebbins High School in Montgomery County, Ohio, was fired 
for confiding in coworkers that she was bisexual.55  The Sixth Circuit held 
that her speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and was, there-
fore, unprotected.56  The court so ruled despite evidence that the employee’s 
revelation had not interfered with her job effectiveness or adversely impacted 
the operation of the school in general.57  “Under the Connick test Ms. Row-
land’s statements were not protected speech,” wrote Chief Judge Pierce Live-
ly.58  The court further noted, “It is clear that she was speaking only in her 
personal interest.”59 
Justice Brennen, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in the denial of 
certiorari, harshly criticizing the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and suggesting 
that it was based upon a “crabbed reading of our precedents.”60  Brennen even 
suggested that the Court’s true motivation was to avoid the larger question at 
stake in the case: whether a state employee could be fired because of his or 
her sexual orientation.61  Though one’s sexual preferences are essentially 
private, Justice Brennen suggested that the rights accorded to the LGBT 
community, even in the mid-1980s, were a matter of public concern.62  Even 
if Rowland’s speech were of private interest, Justice Brennen argued, it de-
served First Amendment protection.63  The overarching goal of the Court in 
Pickering and Connick was to draw a balance between the rights of state em-
ployees to express themselves and the interests of “public employers in oper-
ating their workplaces without disruption.”64  “Speech, even if characterized 
as private, is entitled to constitutional protection,” as long as it “does not in 
any way interfere with employer’s business.”65 
In 1987, the Court addressed whether a public employer could legally 
dismiss an employee for a private remark overheard by another colleague.66   
 54. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (mem.). 
 55. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 56. Id. at 449. 
 57. Id. at 447. 
 58. Id. at 449. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting in the petition for writ of certiorari). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1014–15. 
 63. Id. at 1013. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1012. 
 66. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
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The incident that led to Deputy Constable Ardith McPherson’s firing oc-
curred on March 30, 1981 – the date of the attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan.67  Upon hearing about the incident, McPherson com-
mented to her boyfriend, also employed by the constable, “[I]f they go for 
him again, I hope they get him.”68  A third party overheard the comment and 
reported it to the constable, who fired McPherson immediately.69  The Court 
clarified what may or may not be considered a “public concern” by focusing 
on the inherent public nature of the comment’s subject matter.70 
Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, following the reasoning in both 
Pickering and Connick, and agreed with the Fifth Circuit that McPherson’s 
speech touched on a matter of public concern that was of the utmost im-
portance: the life and death of the President.71 
Justice Lewis Powell, in a concurring opinion, took a different approach.  
He argued that it was unnecessary to apply the “extensive analysis normally 
required by Connick v. Myers,” given that McPherson’s remark was part of a 
private conversation with her boyfriend.72  McPherson could not have reason-
ably expected that her comment would have reached anyone outside of the 
other party involved in the conversation.73  He noted, “The risk that a single, 
offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, dis-
rupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders 
on the fanciful.”74 
The Court reinforced the idea that the non-disruptive private speech of 
government employees is protected in the 1995 decision United States v. Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).75  The NTEU case involved a 
challenge to a section of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned feder-
al employees from accepting compensation for writing articles or making 
speeches.76  The Act’s challengers, which included individual employees and 
large unions, argued that the measure would chill speech, a point with which 
the Supreme Court agreed.77  But the Court pointed out that almost none of 
the employee expression in question had any connection to their jobs, nor 
could it be argued that it could have any negative impact on the workplace.78 
Fewer than ten years later, a police officer in San Diego unsuccessfully 
attempted to rely on NTEU to claim First Amendment protection for his side  
 67. Id. at 381. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 381–82. 
 70. Id. at 384–85. 
 71. Id. at 385–87. 
 72. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 457 
(1995). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 468. 
 78. Id. at 465. 
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business of producing, starring in, and selling adult videos.  In City of San 
Diego v. Roe, the Court upheld the municipal police department’s right to 
discipline, and ultimately fire, the officer, John Roe, as a result of his adult-
oriented commercial activity online.79  Roe sold his videos on the “adults 
only” section of Ebay.80  The videos were police-themed and featured him 
stripping out of a police uniform and engaging in autoerotic acts.81  In addi-
tion to the videos, Roe also sold police-related items, such as an official San 
Diego police uniform, which is ultimately what drew the attention of Roe’s 
supervisor.82 
Roe was ordered to discontinue his online enterprise but did not fully 
comply, which led the department to initiate termination proceedings.83  Roe 
filed suit in federal court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment 
rights.84  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, 
holding that Roe’s speech was not of “public concern” under Connick.85  Cit-
ing NTEU, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Doe’s speech touched on 
a public concern because it did not constitute a workplace grievance, was 
unrelated to his employment, and occurred off duty.86 
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished the 
speech at issue in NTEU, which was unrelated to and had no impact on the 
work or business of the employer, and Doe’s videos, which the Court deter-
mined were “linked to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employ-
er.”87  In the Court’s view, Roe sought to take advantage of his employment 
as a police officer by identifying himself online as an officer of the law and 
theming his videos around his work.88  Videos depicting a police officer “per-
forming indecent acts while in the course of his official duties” would cause 
anyone who might view them to develop serious doubts with regard to the 
San Diego Police Department’s professionalism and mission.89 
In 2006, the Court handed down its most significant decision concerning 
public employee speech rights since Connick.  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the 
Court held that speech occurring in the line of job duties is not protected.90  
Richard Ceballos was a deputy assistant district attorney in Los Angeles 
County.91  As part of Ceballos’s duties as “calendar deputy,” he would review 
 
 79. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84–85 (2004) (per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 78. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 79. 
 84. Id. at 78. 
 85. Id. at 79. 
 86. Id. at 79–80. 
 87. Id. at 81. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–23 (2006). 
 91. Id. at 413. 
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the work of other attorneys in the office at the requests of defense attorneys.92  
One such request came early in 2000, when a defense attorney contacted Ce-
ballos about what he believed were inaccuracies in an affidavit that was used 
to obtain a search warrant in his client’s case.93  Ceballos notified his superi-
ors of his findings and forwarded a recommendation to drop the case.94  His 
superiors proceeded with the prosecution despite his objections.95 
Ceballos’s supervisors subsequently stripped him of his position as cal-
endar secretary, transferred him to another courthouse, and denied him a 
promotion.96  Believing the actions were taken as a result of his recommenda-
tions, he filed a suit in a federal court, alleging that his superiors had illegally 
retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment.97  The district 
court agreed with Ceballos, finding that his free speech rights were violated.98  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that he was clearly speaking as a “citi-
zen upon matters of public concern,” and there was no evidence that his 
speech had caused any type of disruption.99 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ceballos’s recommendation 
to his superiors to drop the case was part of his job; therefore, he was func-
tioning in his role as deputy assistant attorney, not as a private citizen.100  
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “We hold that when public employ-
ees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”101  In the 
Court’s view, Ceballos was not a victim of illegal retaliation over the exercise 
of constitutionally protected speech; rather, he was simply disciplined for 
poor job performance – in this case, making recommendations that his super-
visors may have perceived as “inflammatory or misguided.”102 
The Supreme Court cases discussed above establish First Amendment 
protection for public employees who speak as citizens on matters of public 
concern, so long as their speech does not undermine their job effectiveness or 
disrupt workplace operations under Pickering.  It is also clear under Garcetti 
and Connick that when employees speak pursuant to job duties or on matters 
of private interests, they lose that First Amendment protection.  What is less 
clear is exactly how to determine the nature of an employee’s speech and 
whether he is speaking as an employee or citizen.  The Court’s admonition to 
consider the “content, form and context” of speech has provided minimal  
 92. Id. at 413–14. 
 93. Id. at 413. 
 94. Id. at 414. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 415. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 415–16. 
 100. Id. at 421. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 423. 
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help, and the Court, in its post-Connick decisions, has struggled to provide 
much additional clarity.  The resulting ambiguity has led to conflict between 
circuit courts and calls from legal scholars to abandon the Connick threshold 
test altogether. 
III.  CONNICK: CONFLICT AND CRITICISM 
This section proposes that the Connick decision has left a problematic 
First Amendment legacy.  It begins by highlighting how a significant inter-
pretive split between circuits has resulted in disparate First Amendment rights 
for public employees based upon where they live.  Then, it focuses on schol-
arly criticism of Connick. 
A.  Conflict Between Circuits 
Whatever guidance the Court sought to provide in differentiating citizen 
speech on a public concern from employee speech on a private interest has 
been insufficient, as circuit courts have taken drastically different approaches.  
Specifically, courts have disagreed on what should be the most important 
consideration: content, form, or context.  The majority of circuits have chosen 
a content-based approach in which form and context are largely overlooked if 
the speech is inherently of public interest.103   Other circuits, however, have 
adopted a contextual approach, allowing form and context of speech to trump 
the nature of the content, thus exposing public employees to adverse action 
even when the speech content is non-disruptive and touches on a matter of 
inherent public concern.104 
Contextual circuits place significant weight on both the capacity and the 
motivation of the speaker.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ferrara v. 
Mills exemplifies this approach.  In Ferrara, the court ruled against a public 
school teacher after he criticized his school’s registration, scheduling, and 
teacher assignment processes.105  The teacher was not fired after speaking 
out, but he was assigned to teach exclusively freshman and sophomore cours-
 
 103. Content-based circuits include the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth.  See O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907, 913 (1st Cir. 1993); Cioffi v. 
Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2006); Azzaro 
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978–79 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc); Banks v. Wolfe 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003); Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d 
692, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
 104. Contextual circuits include the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh.  
See Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 69 F.3d 532, *4–5 (4th Cir. 1995); Terrell v. Univ. of 
Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986); Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 
594 (8th Cir. 2002); David v. City & Cty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1356 (10th Cir. 
1996); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515–16 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 105. Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1516. 
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es.106  Though the topics about which he complained might have been inher-
ently of public interest, the court viewed the teacher’s motivation for speak-
ing as purely personal.107  His opposition to the school’s registration system 
was driven by the fact that he thought it contributed to difficulties in control-
ling his classroom.108  The comments regarding teacher assignments were 
merely an extension of a personal grievance over the school’s internal poli-
cies.109  Finally, the teacher’s criticism of out-of-field placements was moti-
vated by the fact that an out-of-field teacher had been assigned the newly 
created social studies class that he wanted to teach.110  Despite the inherent 
public interest in the content of the speech, the court held that a “public em-
ployee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public con-
cern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions 
are run.”111 
Another example of the contextual focus on speaker motivation and ca-
pacity is found in the Fifth Circuit’s decision Terrell v. University of Texas 
System Police.  In this case, the University’s Houston Police Captain Gary 
Terrell secretly kept a diary that was critical of his supervisor, Chief Charles 
Price.112  Photocopies of the diary were anonymously given to Chief Price, 
who terminated Terrell as a result.113  The Fifth Circuit declined to focus on 
the “inherent interest or importance of the matters discussed by the employ-
ee,” because almost anything said in a public office might possibly be consid-
ered of interest to the public.114  Terrell made no effort to communicate the 
contents of his journal to anyone else outside the department.115  The court 
therefore concluded the journal was the unprotected speech of a disgruntled 
government employee, not the protected speech of a citizen.116 
Content-based circuits focus more on the nature of the speech and less 
on the speaker’s motivation or capacity.117  For example, in McKinley v. City 
of Eloy, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Michael McKinley, a peace officer 
 
 106. Id. at 1510. 
 107. Id. at 1516. 
 108. Id. at 1515. 
 109. Id. at 1516. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1361–62 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 113. Id. at 1361. 
 114. Id. at 1362.  Granting First Amendment protection to everything said by a 
public employee would be impractical, according to the court.  See id. 
 115. Id. at 1362–63. 
 116. Id. at 1361.  Although no circuit has adopted a “form-based” approach, it is 
interesting to note that the form of Terrell’s speech, a privately kept diary, was influ-
ential to the Fifth Circuit.  See id. at 1362–63.  The fact that Terrell took no action to 
make his diary public indicated to the court that he was not speaking on a public con-
cern.  See id. 
 117. Smith, supra note 19, at 258–59. 
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who was fired after publicly advocating for an increase in pay.118  In holding 
that McKinley’s speech passed the “public concern” test, the Ninth Circuit 
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgin-
ia, which stated, “The ‘expressly guaranteed freedoms’ of the first amend-
ment ‘share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication 
on matters relating to the functioning of government.’”119  McKinley’s speech 
dealt with compensation rates for police officers, which carried implications 
related to the city’s ability to recruit and retain qualified officers, as well as 
numerous other aspects of police and governmental functioning the court 
viewed as being of inherent interest to the public.120 
The Sixth Circuit also followed a content-based approach when it decid-
ed the case of Netta Banks, an instructional aide in Wolfe County, Ken-
tucky.121  Banks was reassigned after she filed formal complaints with the 
State, alleging irregularities in her school’s interview and hiring processes.122  
The complaints came after a five-year period during which she repeatedly 
interviewed for full-time teaching positions but was never offered a job as a 
certified teacher.123  The Sixth Circuit found evidence in Bank’s testimony 
that suggested mixed motivation for her complaints – not only her personal 
grievance in having been passed over for employment, but also her desire to 
bring attention to and correct systemic problems within the hiring process.124  
While the court acknowledged that Bank’s complaints were predominately 
private, it also found that some of them touched on matters of public concern 
and remanded to the district court for balancing under Pickering.125 
The split between the contextual and content-based circuits is significant 
because it has led to disparate First Amendment protections for public em-
ployees depending on where they live.  Nowhere is this more clearly seen 
than when comparing and contrasting the Tenth Circuit case David v. City & 
County of Denver with the Third Circuit case Azzaro v. County of Alleghe-
ny.126  Both cases dealt with public employees who complained about sexual 
harassment in the public workplace, but the outcomes were starkly different.  
The Tenth Circuit shockingly held that a female officer’s complaints of sexu-
al harassment against male officers were personally motivated and did not 
 
 118. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983).  McKinley 
spoke in favor of a police pay raise at a city council meeting.  Id. 
 119. Id. at 1114 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
575 (1980)). 
 120. Id. at 1114–15. 
 121. Banks v. Wolfe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 893 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 122. Id. at 891. 
 123. Id. at 890. 
 124. Id. at 897. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Compare David v. City & Cty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 
1996), with Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 975–76 (3d Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). 
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touch on a matter of public concern.127  The capacity in which the employee 
spoke was the “fundamental inquiry” in its analysis.128  The speech, accord-
ing to the court, “was calculated to redress personal grievances [and therefore 
spoken as an employee].”129  Had she been motivated to address a broader 
public purpose, the court would have viewed her speech as being that of a 
citizen.130  Her complaints of sexual harassment, therefore, were unprotect-
ed.131  A year later, however, the Third Circuit held that an Allegheny County 
employee had engaged in protected speech over a matter of public concern 
when she complained to the county commissioner about sexual harassment 
by an executive assistant.132  According to the court, the complaint concerned 
an “incident of sexual harassment” allegedly perpetrated by someone “exer-
cising authority in the name of a public official.”133  If true, such conduct by a 
public official would constitute a form of discrimination that would inherent-
ly rise to the level of public concern, regardless of the speaker’s personal 
motivation.134  Clearly, public employees who live in contextual circuits have 
less extensive speech rights than those who live in content-based circuits, a 
disparity that should raise both legal and ethical concerns. 
B.  Criticism of Connick 
In addition to producing conflict and disparity between the circuits, 
Connick has drawn sharp criticism from the scholarly community.  As early 
as 1990, legal scholars were highlighting problems with, and even advocating 
abandoning, Connick.135  Gordon Smith, Dean of the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School at Brigham Young University, proposed an alternative test of “relat-
edness,” which would require asking whether the speech occurred away from 
the workplace and concerned “matters unrelated to workplace personnel or 
policies or unrelated to political issues directly affecting the employee’s 
working relationships.”136  In Dean Smith’s proposal, if the employee were to 
engage in speech unrelated to and away from the workplace, then he would 
be acting in the capacity of a citizen and should be absolutely protected.137  If, 
on the other hand, the employee speaks at work or on a matter related to the 
 
 127. David, 101 F.3d at 1356. 
 128. Id. at 1355 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). 
 129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 483 
(10th Cir. 1994)). 
 130. See David, 101 F.3d at 1355. 
 131. Id. at 1356. 
 132. Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 133. Id. at 978. 
 134. Id. at 979. 
 135. Smith, supra note 19, at 266. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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workplace, he would be acting in his capacity as an employee, and his speech 
would then be balanced under Pickering.138 
Mary Rose Papandrea, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina School of Law, also criticized reliance on the Con-
nick “threshold question,” arguing that it “undermines” the constitutional 
rights of public school teachers.139  She would entirely abandon the Picker-
ing/Connick framework, on grounds that it allows school districts too much 
latitude to discipline teachers without having to prove that the speech inter-
fered with school business.140  Associate Dean Papandrea called for presump-
tive First Amendment protection for private teacher speech unless the school 
district can demonstrate a substantial “nexus” between the speech and teacher 
job effectiveness.141 
One scholar has warned that any expressive content posted by a public 
educator that does not touch on a matter of public concern only has to reach 
the wrong parent, student, or school board member to become a job-
threatening event.142  In a 2010 article in the University of Dayton Law Re-
view, Patricia Niddifer suggested that it is unreasonable for a teacher to face 
adverse work consequences as a result of posting content that, while not 
touching on a public concern, may be neither broadly offensive nor inappro-
priate.143  The author advocated abandoning Connick in favor of a modified 
Pickering balancing test in which the teacher’s First Amendment interests are 
balanced against the State’s rights as an educator rather than employer.144  
That same year, an article in the Valparaiso University Law Review contained 
a proposal for examining the online speech of teachers that involved placing 
the content of the speech along a continuum, with purely private speech on 
one end, political or social speech in the middle, and speech relating to em-
ployment on the other end.145  According to the article, if the speech is purely 
private, then the speaker will always be acting as a private citizen and should 
therefore be protected completely by the First Amendment.146 
The proposals these scholars advance are thought-provoking and would 
advance the speech rights of public educators.  But, the majority of these pro-
posals likely tip the scales too far in the direction of the employee, not giving 
adequate consideration to the level of disruption the employer might suffer.  
This is particularly true in sensitive environments such as public education 
and law enforcement.  Even when speaking in the capacity of a private citizen 
on matters of public concern, a public educator who engages in expression 
 
 138. Id. at 266–67. 
 139. Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1634. 
 140. Id. at 1630. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Nidiffer, supra note 19, at 135. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 136. 
 145. Akiti, supra note 19, at 161. 
 146. Id. at 163. 
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that reasonably calls into question his judgment, decision-making ability, or 
general commitment to treating students with fairness can have a tremendous 
negative impact on the school community. 
The broadly expressed concern of these scholars – that courts would rely 
on Connick to effectively exclude educators from First Amendment protec-
tion whenever they engage in online expressive activity – certainly seems 
justified.  But as litigation involving public educators and social media has 
increased over the last ten years, it is worth considering whether these fears 
have been realized.  Has Connick, in fact, stripped public educators of First 
Amendment protection for social media expression? 
IV.  FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING INTERNET-BASED EMPLOYEE 
SPEECH 
This section focuses on recent federal cases that deal specifically with 
public employee speech disseminated via social media or other Internet-based 
forms of communication.  It first reviews four decisions from the federal 
courts of appeals and then focuses on a sampling of illustrative cases from 
various federal district courts.  In the discussion of these cases, a number of 
trends will emerge regarding both the application of the Connick public con-
cern/private interest test, as well as the Pickering balancing test. 
A.  Circuit Courts 
Four federal circuits have decided cases dealing with public employees 
and Internet-based expression.  The Connick public concern/private interest 
test was not decisive in any of the cases.  Instead, each case turned on the 
analysis of the employee speech under Pickering, which led to the employee 
prevailing in only one of the four cases. 
The first of these cases came in the summer of 2009, when the Ninth 
Circuit decided the case of Tara Richerson, a curriculum specialist and in-
structional coach at Central Kitsap School District in Washington State.147  
Richerson published a blog in which she made personally insulting remarks 
about her supervisors and colleagues.148  There were numerous complaints 
regarding Richerson’s blog, including one from a teacher Richerson 
coached.149  As a result, the human resources director reassigned Richerson 
from coaching back into a teaching role.150  Richerson claimed that she had 
been retaliated against in violation of her First Amendment rights.151  The 
 
 147. Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009), amended (Aug. 
27, 2009). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.152 
The Ninth Circuit bypassed the Connick threshold question by assum-
ing, without deciding, that some of Richerson’s speech was related to a mat-
ter of public concern.153  Richerson’s speech, however, could not survive 
scrutiny under Pickering.154  The court specifically looked at whether Richer-
son’s blog was disruptive to relationships in the workplace, particularly those 
“premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality.”155  Additionally, the court 
analyzed whether the blog interfered with Richerson’s effectiveness in her 
role.156  “It is abundantly clear from undisputed evidence in the record,” the 
court concluded, “that Richerson’s speech had a significantly deleterious 
effect in each of these ways.”157  Because her role as an instructional coach 
relied upon personal relationships and several teachers refused to work with 
her in the wake of her blog, the Ninth Circuit determined her speech was suf-
ficiently disruptive to justify the transfer.158 
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit decided Bland v. Roberts, becoming the first 
court of appeals to decide a case dealing specifically with public employee 
speech and social media.159  B.J. Roberts, the sheriff of Hampton, Virginia, 
won re-election and subsequently decided not to reappoint eight employ-
ees.160  Two of the employees, Daniel Ray Carter and Robert McCoy, had 
engaged in expressive activities on social media and argued that Roberts was 
illegally motivated to fire them after they had supported his opponent, Jim 
Adams. 161 
Carter and McCoy were both deputy sheriffs in Hampton.162  After Ad-
ams announced his candidacy, Carter visited and “liked” the Adams cam-
paign Facebook page.163  In addition, he posted a brief comment of sup-
port.164  McCoy posted a similar message of support on the Adams page.165  
When Roberts became aware of the two men’s social media support of Ad-
ams’s candidacy, he made general statements warning employees that public-
ly supporting Adams would be grounds for termination.166  At one point, 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 2013), amended (Sept. 23, 
2013). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 372–73. 
 162. Id. at 376. 
 163. Id. at 380. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 381. 
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Roberts angrily confronted Carter: “You made your bed, and now you’re 
going to lie in it – after the election, you’re gone.”167  The sheriff argued, and 
the district court agreed, that when Carter “liked” the Adams campaign page, 
it was not “speech” for the purposes of the First Amendment.168  The court of 
appeals disagreed, suggesting that “[o]nce one understands the nature of what 
Carter did by liking the Campaign Page, it becomes apparent that his conduct 
qualifies as speech.”169  The court continued: “In the context of a political 
campaign’s Facebook page, the meaning that the user approves of the candi-
dacy whose page is being liked is unmistakable.”170  Then, the court turned to 
the Connick public/private threshold question and determined that Carter and 
McCoy had both spoken on a matter inherently linked to public concern – 
politics.171  Because the sheriff failed to show that Carter and McCoy had 
caused disruption through their speech, the balancing test under Pickering 
tipped toward the two employees.172 
Later in 2013, the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Bryan Craig, a 
high school guidance counselor and girls basketball coach whose self-
published book raised red flags for his employer.173  Craig was a tenured em-
ployee at Rich Central High School in Chicago’s southern suburban area.174  
His 2012 book, It’s Her Fault, was purportedly a “self-help” book for women 
interested in improving their romantic relationships.175  Craig’s thesis was 
that women act based upon emotion rather than intellect.176  He advised fe-
male readers that, in order to shift the balance of power toward them in their 
relationships, they should use sex to control men’s behavior.177  He also ad-
vised women to be sexually submissive in order to make their men “feel” as 
if they had power in the relationship.178  The book was replete with explicit 
discussion of sexual topics, including a “comparative analysis of the female 
genitalia of various races,” which went “into an excruciating degree of graph-
ic detail.”179 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 384. 
 169. Id. at 386. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 388. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 
2013).  This case did not involve social media or Internet communication, per se.  See 
id.  But like blogging and social media, the practice of self-publishing utilizes tech-
nology to allow individuals to more easily make their unfiltered writing broadly 
available to the public.  It is, therefore, a case that has relevance to this study. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1114. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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In the introduction and throughout the book, Craig referenced his em-
ployment at Rich Central High School and, specifically, his experience as a 
counselor to bolster his qualifications for giving relationship advice.180  When 
the district learned of It’s Her Fault, it terminated Craig’s employment.181  
The board cited “disruption, concern, distrust and confusion” within the 
community.182  The board also alleged that Craig’s conduct had created “an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment,” and that he had 
“failed to present [himself as] a positive role model and failed to properly 
comport himself in accordance with his professional obligations as a public 
teacher.”183 
Craig filed suit in federal court, claiming a First Amendment violation, 
but the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, hold-
ing that It’s Her Fault did not touch on a matter of public concern.184  In do-
ing so, the district court relied heavily on City of San Diego v. Roe, and, in 
fact, deemed that It’s Her Fault was substantially similar to Roe’s police-
themed adult videos, a proposition that the Seventh Circuit dismissed on ap-
peal.185  “Whatever one may think of Craig’s book,” the court explained, “it 
is fundamentally different in character from the ‘debased parody’ at issue in 
Roe.”186  It’s Her Fault, while provocative, at least addressed “the structure of 
adult relationships, an issue with which some segment of the public would be 
interested.”187  In the court’s view, the dynamics of adult relationships was an 
overall topic of public interest, and therefore, Craig’s book progressed to the 
balancing test under Pickering.188 
Interestingly, the court pointed out that the circumstances in the case did 
not really merit consideration of Connick because the public/private question 
was designed to evaluate speech only in cases where “a public employee 
speaks out about her employer’s policies, conduct, or other issues more di-
rectly related to her public employment.”189  Put another way, the exercise of 
analyzing the public or private nature of the content of an employee’s speech 
was merely a method to help courts distinguish between an employee’s 
“purely personal gripe,” which is unprotected, and a citizen’s attempt to “no-
tify the public of a work-related issue about which the public is concerned,” 
which is protected.190 
 
 180. Id. at 1114–15. 
 181. Id. at 1115. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (alteration in original). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1117–18. 
 186. Id. at 1117 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81–82 (2004) 
(per curiam)). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1117–18. 
 189. Id. at 1116 n.2. 
 190. Id. 
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Though Craig’s speech did qualify as touching on matters of public con-
cern, the school district prevailed in the balancing test, and his termination 
was upheld.191  The court found it reasonable to predict that students and par-
ents would ultimately become aware of It’s Her Fault and that this would 
impact Craig’s ability to function effectively in his job.192  “Knowing Craig’s 
tendency to objectify women,” the court reasoned, “defendants could reason-
ably anticipate that some female students would feel uncomfortable reaching 
out to Craig for advice.”193  The court went even further, suggesting “some 
students may forego receiving the school’s counseling services entirely rather 
than take the risk that Craig would not view them as a person but instead as 
an object.”194 
The most recent appellate case dealing with an educator and Internet-
based speech came out of the Third Circuit in 2015.  Natalie Munroe was a 
tenured English teacher at Central Bucks East High School in Doylestown, 
Pennsylvania.195  Between August of 2014 and November of 2015, Munroe 
made eighty-four entries on her blog, mostly discussing various areas of per-
sonal interest, such as yoga, food, movies, and her own children.196  In select 
posts, however, she commented on her students and co-workers.197  In Octo-
ber of 2009, Munroe wrote about her students, calling them “rude, disen-
gaged, lazy whiners.”198  In January of 2010, Munroe mused about comments 
she would like to enter on a student’s report card, such as “[f]rightfully dim,” 
“[l]azy asshole,” “argumentative fuck,” and “[u]tterly loathsome in all imagi-
nable ways.”199 
Students discovered the blog and began discussing it via social media.200  
The school became aware of Munroe’s blog in February of 2011 after a local 
newspaper began raising questions.201  The principal, Abram Lucabaugh, 
confronted Munroe about the blog and immediately suspended her with 
pay.202  Lucabaugh described the fallout from the blog as a “ticking time 
bomb” and reported that angry students were distributing printed copies of 
the blog entries in the hallways.203  Ultimately, over 200 parents contacted the 
school, requesting that their children not be placed in Munroe’s class.204 
 
 191. Id. at 1119. 
 192. Id. at 1119–20. 
 193. Id. at 1120. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 457–58 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 460. 
 199. Id. at 459–60. 
 200. Id. at 462. 
 201. Id. at 461–62. 
 202. Id. at 462. 
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 204. Id. 
21
Black: When Teachers Go Viral
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
72 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
On March 1, Munroe went on maternity leave, which had been sched-
uled prior to the district learning of her blog.205  Between her paid suspension 
and maternity leave, Munroe was out for the remainder of the school year, 
while the district deliberated over the constitutional implications of terminat-
ing her employment.206  Munroe returned to work in August of 2011 for the 
new school year.207  She was placed on a highly prescriptive growth plan, 
including a requirement that she complete lesson plans she believed were, by 
design, impossible to complete accurately.208  At the year’s end, her supervi-
sor gave her an unsatisfactory evaluation, and the district terminated her em-
ployment.209  Munroe challenged the decision in federal court, alleging that 
the district had retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment 
rights.210  The district court granted summary judgment for the school district, 
and Munroe appealed to the Third Circuit.211 
The Third Circuit focused on the public concern/private interest ques-
tion presented in Connick.212  While the vast majority of her blog posts were 
related to private interests, the court acknowledged the district court’s finding 
that Munroe did occasionally write on matters that might be of public con-
cern, such as “academic integrity, the value of honor, and students’ lack of 
effort.”213  The court also recognized that Munroe only addressed these topics 
incidentally, while focusing primarily on her personal reactions to “negative 
interactions between herself and her students.”214  Munroe used the extensive 
media coverage to touch more deeply on the larger areas of public interest she 
mentioned in her blog.  “We reluctantly assume for the purposes of this opin-
ion that Munroe’s speech satisfied the ‘public concern’ requirement,” wrote 
the court.215 
After concluding that Munroe’s blog posts dealt with a public concern, 
Circuit Judge Cowan turned to the balancing test under Pickering.216  The 
“opprobrious” tone of Munroe’s blog posts was a dispositive factor in their 
failure to survive balancing under Pickering.217  The court reasoned that “in-
vective directed against the very persons that the governmental agency is 
meant to serve could be expected to have serious consequences for the per-
 
 205. Id. at 463. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 464. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 457. 
 212. Id. at 467–69. 
 213. Id. at 468 (quoting Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532, 
537 (E.D. Pa. 2014)). 
 214. Id. (quoting Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 537–38). 
 215. Id. at 470. 
 216. Id. at 472. 
 217. Id. at 473. 
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formance of the speaker’s duties and the agency’s regular operations.”218  But 
the court also noted that more elevated speech would be much less likely to 
“impair discipline or employee harmony” or otherwise cause a disruption.219 
B.  District Courts 
Because the technological advances in communication have largely 
happened within the last ten years, there has been a limited number of cases 
involving Internet-based speech and public employees in the lower federal 
courts, although the number has increased in recent years.  In some of the 
earliest cases, such as Spanierman v. Hughes and Snyder v. Millersville Uni-
versity, the courts relied on the Connick public concern/private interest test to 
disqualify teacher social media activity from First Amendment protection.220  
In more recent cases, federal courts have seemed more likely to hold (or at 
least assume) that public employee speech addresses matters of public con-
cern.221  This section provides a sample of several recent lower court deci-
sions.222 
In 2011, a federal district court heard the first case involving a public 
employee’s Facebook post.223  A federal district court in Arkansas held in 
favor of Dana Mattingly, who was fired from her job in the circuit clerk’s 
office in Saline County, Arkansas, after making a Facebook post in which she 
expressed sympathy for her terminated co-workers.224  Dennis Milligan had 
been elected Saline County Circuit Clerk in 2010.225  On December 27, 2010, 
Milligan dismissed four of the nine employees within the circuit clerk’s of-
fice.226  According to Mattingly, at least two of the four terminated employ-
ees had supported Milligan’s political opponent.227  Later that evening, Mat-
tingly posted the following comment on her Facebook page: “[M]y heart goes 
out to the ladies in my office that were told by letter they were no longer 
 
 218. Id. at 474. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07–1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *39–43 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 221. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637 (9th Cir. 2009), amended (Aug. 
27, 2009); Munroe, 805 F.3d at 458; Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 387 (4th Cir. 
2013), amended (Sept. 23, 2013); Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 
1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 222. Ten district court cases were reviewed for this Article; five are included in 
the discussion, and all ten are summarized in Table 1 on page 86. 
 223. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
126665, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011). 
 224. Id. at *8. 
 225. Id. at *1. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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needed ... It’s sad.”228  The post elicited expressions of both anger and con-
cern from a number of Mattingly’s 1300 Facebook friends.229  According to 
Milligan, he received multiple critical phone calls from anonymous callers at 
his home that evening.230  Ultimately, the controversy attracted the attention 
of local media.231   
The following day, Milligan fired Mattingly via telephone.232  He later 
sent written notification, citing the fallout from her comments that were made 
“in a public domain.”233  Mattingly filed suit in federal court, claiming her 
First Amendment speech rights had been violated.234  In court, Milligan ar-
gued that Mattingly’s motive in posting her comment was the purely personal 
concern of eliciting “affirmation and support” from her Facebook friends and 
should not be protected.235  The court answered that, even if Mattingly’s mo-
tives were personal, “the fact remains that she did not make them as an em-
ployee but as a citizen.”236  The form of her speech (the “public domain” of 
Facebook), as well as the fact that local media had expressed interest in the 
story, suggested to the court that the matter was of public concern.237  Under 
the Pickering balancing test, Milligan could not produce ample evidence that 
Mattingly’s Facebook post had any disruptive impact on the efficacy of the 
circuit clerk’s office, so she prevailed on her First Amendment claim.238 
The Mattlingly case is informative in several respects.  First, it is an ex-
ample of a case in which the form of the expression (a public Facebook post 
to over 1300 friends) was a distinct factor the judge weighed in holding that 
the speech touched on a matter of public concern.  Second, it illustrates how 
speech attracting media attention can influence a judge’s determination that 
the speech touched on an inherently public concern.  Third, the case under-
scores the importance of employers documenting any workplace disturbance 
that might result from employee speech.  This lack of evidence was the rea-
son that Mattingly’s speech claim was able to withstand the scrutiny of the 
Pickering test.239 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in early 
2014, issued a ruling in Duke v. Hamil, a case dealing with a police officer 
who posted an image of the Confederate flag.240  Rex Duke was the Deputy 
Chief of Police at the Clayton State University (“CSU”) Police Department  
 228. Id. at *2 (alteration in original). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at *4. 
 232. Id. at *4–5. 
 233. Id. at *5. 
 234. Id. at *1. 
 235. Id. at *9. 
 236. Id. at *10. 
 237. Id. at *11. 
 238. Id. at *12. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
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near Atlanta, Georgia.241  Duke had thirty-plus years of experience and a 
clean record of service when, in November of 2012, he posted an image of 
the flag, along with the comment, “It’s time for the second revolution,” on his 
Facebook page.242  Duke’s posting came in the aftermath of the 2012 presi-
dential election as an expression of “general dissatisfaction with Washington 
politicians.”243  The post came to the attention of an Atlanta television station, 
and the department began receiving complaints regarding the matter.244  After 
an investigation, Duke was demoted from the position of deputy chief to an 
undesirable morning patrol duty typically reserved for inexperienced officers, 
which resulted in a $15,000 cut in annual pay.245 
Duke filed a lawsuit against the CSU Chief of Police, Bobby Hamil, 
claiming that Hamil had violated his First Amendment rights by demoting 
him in retaliation for “privately advocating for his personal political be-
liefs.”246  “[B]ecause it expressed disapproval of elected officials,” the court 
reasoned that Duke’s post dealt with a topic of importance to an informed 
electorate.247  Therefore, it easily passed the “public concern” requirement of 
Connick.248  The court then turned to the balancing test under Pickering, 
where Duke’s speech failed decisively.249  Holding in Hamil’s favor, Judge 
Richard Story explained that the post could convey messages that were more 
troubling than simple disapproval of Washington politicians.250  “Many of 
these messages are controversial, divisive, and prejudicial to say the least,” 
explained Judge Story.251  Because Duke was second-in-command, the court 
viewed it as reasonable to foresee a negative impact on the “discipline, mutu-
al respect, or trust” among those who Duke supervised.252  Further, Duke’s 
speech conveyed ideas that might undermine the department’s reputation, as 
well as the public trust.253  “[M]any in the community would take offense to 
his chosen form of speech,” Judge Story argued, “not just because they dis-
approve of it, but because it raises concerns of Plaintiff’s prejudice – and the 
Department’s.”254 
The court believed the racial overtones of Duke’s post raised serious 
questions regarding Duke’s ability to treat all members of the community he 
served in a fair manner, regardless of their race or ethnicity.  This rationale  
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1294. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1300. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1303. 
 250. Id. at 1301. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1302. 
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could easily be applied to a teacher or school administrator who posts images 
or remarks online that could be viewed as racially inflammatory.  Because it 
is critical for parents and students to perceive that school employees are mak-
ing decisions that impact them in a just and ethical manner, this type of ex-
pressive behavior seems highly likely to damage an educator’s effectiveness. 
An example of how racially insensitive remarks can provide grounds for 
dismissal in an educational setting occurred in 2015, when a federal district 
court ruled against Mary Czaplinski, a school security guard in Vineland, 
New Jersey, after she announced on Facebook that she was “praying hard” 
for a Philadelphia police officer who was shot and killed in the line of duty by 
“another black thug.”255  Her post also included the exhortation that “white 
people should start riots and protests.”256  Czaplinski attempted to temper her 
comments a day later, commenting that “there are thugs of every race,” but it 
was already too late.257  By the end of the day, her post had been anonymous-
ly forwarded to the superintendent of Vineland schools.258 
Czaplinski was immediately suspended, and within a week, the district 
held a hearing and terminated her.259  In the letter informing her of her termi-
nation, the district stated the following: 
School personnel are entrusted to use training, judgment, and com-
mitment to fairness to diffuse, resolve and/or appropriately react to 
disputes, rules violations, safety concerns, and other day-to-day events 
which might otherwise compromise student learning and school cli-
mate. . . . Your pronouncement has greatly jeopardized your ability to 
effectively conduct the business of public school safety and security 
because it reasonably calls into question the basis of your decision-
making.260 
Czaplinski sought an injunction against her termination on the basis that it 
violated her First Amendment right to free speech.261  In denying her request, 
the court acknowledged that she was speaking in the capacity of a private 
citizen on a matter of public concern but found that her First Amendment 
claim was unlikely to succeed because, as the school district had aptly point-
ed out in the letter of termination, her comment could “reasonably be pre-
sumed to impede her proper performance of her daily duties as a security 
guard.”262 
 
 255. Czaplinski v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS), 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at *3. 
 259. Id. at *3–4. 
 260. Id. at *4–5. 
 261. Id. at *1. 
 262. Id. at *9–10. 
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In September of 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia decided the case of Liverman v. City of Petersburg.  This case is 
particularly interesting because it dealt with two police officers who were 
disciplined over an exchange on social media, and only one of the two was 
able to prevail on his First Amendment claim.263  Herbert Liverman and 
Vance Richards were veteran officers in the Petersburg Police Department in 
Virginia.264  In the summer of 2013, Liverman commented on his personal 
Facebook page about what he perceived as inexperienced and under-qualified 
officers being promoted to leadership positions in law enforcement.265  He 
emphasized the safety-related concerns of placing inexperienced officers in 
specialty units or as instructors.266  He cited a 2006 FBI report to support his 
claims.267  The post was “liked” by over thirty of Liverman’s contacts, many 
of whom were department employees.268  Liverman’s post also prompted 
numerous comments, one of which was Richards’s.269 
Richards voiced his support of Liverman and alluded to a specific ex-
ample of someone who had received what he considered to be an undeserving 
promotion: “[Y]ou know who I’m talking about . . . How can ANYONE look 
up, or give respect to a SGT in Patrol with ONLY 1 1/2 years experience in 
the street?  Or less as a matter of fact.”270  Liverman responded to Richards’s 
comment by stating: “There used to be a time when you had to earn a promo-
tion or a spot in a specialty unit . . . but now it seems as though anything goes 
and beyond officer safety and questions of liability, these positions have been 
‘devalued.’”271  Richards then added “[y]our Agency is only as good as it’s 
[sic] Leader(s) . . . It’s hard to ‘lead by example’ when there isn’t one . . . 
smh.”272 
After an employee brought the posts to the department’s attention, the 
two officers were investigated and ultimately disciplined for violating the 
department’s social media policy.273  Both officers were returned to “proba-
tionary status,” which excluded them from promotion eligibility.274  The men 
sought relief in federal court, claiming the department’s social media policy 
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.275 
 
 263. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 106 F. Supp. 3d 744 (E.D. Va. 2015), af-
firmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 264. Id. at 750. 
 265. Id. at 750–51. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 752. 
 269. Id. at 751. 
 270. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 271. Id. (alteration in original). 
 272. Id. (third alteration in original).  Note that “smh” is an abbreviation meaning 
“shaking my head.” 
 273. Id. at 752. 
 274. Id. at 753. 
 275. Id. at 754. 
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District Judge James Spencer analyzed the comments each officer made 
individually and determined that, while Liverman had commented as a citizen 
on matters of public concern, Richards had only spoken in his capacity as an 
employee on matters of personal interest.276  “Liverman was participating in 
or propelling a debate over public safety as a ‘member of a community most 
likely to have informed and definite opinions,’” wrote Judge Spencer.277  
Richards’s comments, on the other hand, “pertained to personal grievances 
and complaints about conditions of employment rather than broad mat-
ters.”278  After finding that Liverman’s speech was protected, the court then 
turned to the balancing test under Pickering.  Because the police department 
had not presented sufficient evidence to suggest that Liverman’s comments 
had harmed the department, or had the reasonable potential to do so, the bal-
ancing test leaned in Liverman’s favor.279 
In October of 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
West Virginia decided Austin v. Preston County Commission.280  Courtney 
Austin was the Director of the Preston County Animal Shelter and adminis-
tered a Facebook page for the shelter within the auspices of her own personal 
Facebook account.281  Between February of 2012 and January of 2013, Austin 
was disciplined on two separate occasions for content that she had posted on 
the shelter’s page.282  The first post celebrated the shelter having gone sixty 
days without euthanizing an animal and urged citizens to like the post to sup-
port a no-kill facility.283  The second included a complaint about alleged loss 
of heat and water at the shelter during cold weather, which prompted a num-
ber of incoming phone calls to commissioners from citizens who were con-
cerned about the animals’ welfare.284 
After the second post, members of the commission stipulated that Austin 
should not post anything on the page without the approval of at least two 
commissioners.285  The commission also requested access to the Facebook 
page, a request Austin declined because the page was created from within her 
personal Facebook page.286  The commissioners and Austin discussed simply 
closing the page and starting a new one but decided against it because the 
page was already established within the community.287  An ITS employee 
 
 276. Id. at 759–60. 
 277. Id. at 758 (alteration omitted) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 572 (1968)). 
 278. Id. at 759. 
 279. Id. at 765. 
 280. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, No. 1:13CV135, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
146041 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014). 
 281. Id. at *3. 
 282. Id. at *4, *7–8. 
 283. Id. at *3–4. 
 284. Id. at *4–5. 
 285. Id. at *6. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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was directed to find a way to grant the commissioners access to the page 
without compromising Austin’s personal Facebook privacy.288  Eventually, 
the commissioners directed Austin to change her password.289  However, 
rather than complying, Austin unilaterally decided to shut the page down.290  
Within a week after Austin’s deletion of the Facebook page, the commission 
voted unanimously to terminate her employment.291 
Austin challenged her dismissal in federal court as illegal retaliation for 
her exercise of speech protected by the First Amendment.292  The court relied 
on a broad reading of Garcetti in ruling against her.293  “An employee may 
still be acting ‘pursuant to official duties,’” the court argued, “even if she 
engages in speech that is not part of her official job duties so long as it is in 
furtherance of such job duties.”294  Though Austin’s official job duties did not 
include maintaining a shelter Facebook page, and indeed the page was estab-
lished and maintained through her own personal page, the court felt that, 
when posting on the shelter page, Austin was acting pursuant to job duties.295  
She did not use the page for personal communication, only for shelter busi-
ness.296  The page was titled Preston County Animal Shelter, and Austin post-
ed in that name as opposed to her own.297  The shelter’s Facebook page was 
listed in shelter information as its official website.298  All of this led the court 
to conclude that Austin was speaking in the capacity of an employee “pursu-
ant to her job duties,” and, as such, had no claim under the First Amend-
ment.299 
This decision is significant because it is the only case reviewed in which 
employee speech was disqualified from First Amendment protection because 
of the Garcetti standard.  Because school employees often maintain websites 
for classes or school programs such as band or orchestra, it is possible that 
such online speech could be considered pursuant to job duties, although 
school administrators should be cautious.300 
 
 288. Id. at *6–7. 
 289. Id. at *7. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at *8. 
 292. Id. at *9. 
 293. Id. at *13–16. 
 294. Id. at *15–16 (quoting Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 
2010)). 
 295. Id. at *17. 
 296. Id. at *16. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at *16–17. 
 299. Id. at *19. 
 300. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 
2008) (when a teacher set up a class MySpace page, the court did not view his speech 
as “pursuant to job duties” because he used the site to communicate with students 
about personal matters as well as school matters). 
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In sum, this section has highlighted the way in which federal district and 
circuit courts have applied existing precedent regarding the First Amendment 
speech rights of public employees in cases dealing specifically with Internet-
based expression.  In reviewing these cases, there are lessons to be learned.  
The following section draws upon these lessons in order to outline a process 
that will enable public school administrators to analyze controversial employ-
ee speech that has gone viral and make decisions that are legally and ethically 
defensible. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
In Connick, Justice White created a threshold to Pickering designed to 
protect public employers from what he viewed as an unreasonable burden of 
having to defend the constitutionality of routine employment decisions.301  
Extending the Connick test to public employee speech that is completely un-
related to the workplace seems not only out of line with Justice White’s in-
tent, but also of limited utility.  In Connick, the content and capacity variables 
were presented as if they were perfectly correlated.  That is, “employee 
speech” is explicitly linked with “private interests” and “citizen speech” with 
“public concerns.”  But when a public educator posts social media content, he 
is frequently acting in the capacity of a citizen, while still communicating on 
a matter of private interest – a combination that the test was not designed to 
evaluate.  This limited utility may explain why one circuit court simply as-
sumed that speech met the Connick public concern requirement and relied on 
the Pickering test to evaluate cases involving the online speech of educators 
and other public employees.302  Twelve of the sixteen employees in the cases 
reviewed lost their free speech claims, but only three of them had their speech 
disqualified under Connick.  When employees did win these cases, it was 
only because their employers failed to show a disruption under Pickering.  
The implication for school administrators is clear: it is not prudent to pursue 
negative employment action against an employee without first assessing evi-
dence of any adverse impact the speech may have had on institutional effica-
cy.    
It does not impose an unreasonable burden to require a public school 
administrator to consider whether an employee’s private speech has adversely 
impacted school operations when considering negative employment action.  
Because the concept of disruption is so expansively defined in Pickering, the 
balance will generally favor the employer in cases where an employee’s 
 
 301. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
 302. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009), amended 
(Aug. 27, 2009).  Although twelve of sixteen employees in the cases reviewed lost 
their free speech claims, only three had their speech disqualified under Connick.  
When public employers discipline their employees because of their online expressive 
activity, the courts are generally supportive, as long as the employer can show evi-
dence of some type of workplace disruption. 
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speech has truly caused problems, even if it is unrelated to work.303  Picker-
ing allows public employers to punish employees for speech that interrupts 
office routines, distracts workers, damages workplace relationships, or 
demonstrates disloyalty or incompetence.304  But when a public employee 
engages in private speech that does not meet the broad definition of “disrup-
tive,” as set forth in Pickering, then how can an employer ethically justify 
adverse action? 
Clearly, public school administrators need a new framework to guide 
them in implementing legally defensible personnel decisions regarding edu-
cator online speech.  The following proposal is a step-by-step decision-
making model for administrators that will serve to broaden, define, and pro-
tect educator speech rights in the age of the Internet.  Yet it will still safe-
guard the state’s legitimate interest in institutional efficacy.  The framework 
requires a balanced examination of both content and capacity variables and is 
based on philosophical assumptions that acknowledge the complex relation-
ship between those variables.  Most importantly, the model comports with 
and does not require abandoning any black letter law. 
A.  The New Threshold Question 
With Garcetti, the Court introduced the question of whether public em-
ployee speech occurs pursuant to job duties.305  In doing so, the Court devel-
oped a new “threshold” question – one that is more narrowly constructed than 
the Connick public/private dichotomy.  This query becomes the first step in 
the new framework: was the speech made pursuant to job duties?  If not, then 
it passes to the next stage of the analysis.  If the speech was made pursuant to 
job duties, then it is unprotected.306 
When principals specifically direct teachers to communicate with stu-
dents or parents via social media sites, the exchanges would likely be pursu-
ant to job duties.  Even when an employee acts upon his own initiative, his 
social media activity could be considered “pursuant to job duties” in some 
cases.  For example, a high school band director who creates a band page on 
Facebook to communicate with students and parents regarding band activities 
would likely be acting in furtherance of his job duties.  The West Virginia 
case of Austin v. Preston County Commission provides an example of an em-
ployee who, at her own initiative, established and maintained the County 
Animal Shelter Facebook page.  She posted on the page as “Preston County  
 303. Smith, supra note 19, at 252. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
 306. Whether speech can be considered “pursuant to job duties” is a difficult 
question and requires school administrators to be aware of their state whistle-blower 
laws, as well as any holdings within their circuits regarding academic freedom at the 
pre-kindergarten level.  Only one of the cases reviewed in this Article featured a hold-
ing that an educator had engaged in online speech that was considered “pursuant to 
job duties,” so a cautious approach is advised. 
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Animal Shelter,” exclusively regarding shelter business.  Thus, her expressive 
activity on the page fell within the scope of her duties as shelter director.307  
Different circumstances, however, will produce different results, and when 
unsure, employers should err conservatively and assume that the speech was 
not pursuant to job duties, thus allowing it to move to step two of the test. 
B.  Is the Speech of Inherent Public Concern? 
In the second step in the new test, we consider the public con-
cern/private interest threshold test from Connick, but only as a vehicle to help 
us identify whether an employee is speaking in his “citizen capacity.”  The 
Supreme Court, in City of San Diego v. Roe, attempted to clarify the pub-
lic/private dichotomy by declaring that in order for speech to qualify as a 
matter of public concern, it must be “something that is a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to 
the public at the time of publication.”308  The First, Second, and Third Cir-
cuits have agreed in O’Connor, Cioffi, and Azzaro, respectively, that speech 
that adds value to the process of self-governance and citizens’ ability to make 
informed decisions regarding their government is inherently of public con-
cern.309 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that the personal motivation of 
a speaker should not detract from the inherent public concern of the con-
tent.310  A public employee (not speaking pursuant to job duties) who speaks 
out on a matter of public concern is automatically functioning, at least partial-
ly, in his capacity as a citizen, and his rights should be balanced appropriately 
against the state’s interests.  Therefore, if it is determined that the content of 
the speech itself at least touches partially on a matter of inherent public con-
cern, then it should advance to step four of the test, analysis under Pickering.  
If the speech does not even partially touch on a public concern, the analysis 
advances to step three, where there is no assumption that the speaker is acting 
as a citizen.  When speaking solely on private interests, the employee may be 
speaking either in the capacity of a citizen, an employee, or in a mixed capac-
ity. 
 
 307. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146041, at *16 
(N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014). 
 308. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 309. O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 913–14 (1st Cir. 1993); Cioffi v. Averill 
Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2006); Azzaro v. Cty. 
of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 310. See Banks v. Wolfe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d. 888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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C.  Private Concern Speech: Determining Capacity 
If speech was not made pursuant to job duties and does not touch on a 
matter of inherent public concern, then it must be private interest speech.  In 
this step of the process, the speaker’s capacity is the primary consideration 
because an employee speaking on private interests might be speaking as a 
citizen, as an employee, or in a mixed capacity.  It is important to note the 
contours of what it means to be functioning in the capacity of an employee 
versus the capacity as a citizen.  Not everything said by an employee during 
the course of the workday constitutes “employee” speech.  State employees 
who engage in private and personal conversations during the course of the 
workday would very likely be speaking in their capacities as private citizens 
and not employees.  Justice Powell touched on this in his concurrence in 
Rankin v. McPherson, where he highlighted the private nature of McPher-
son’s conversation with her boyfriend, even though the conversation occurred 
at work and during work hours.311  Justice Powell attached importance to the 
fact that McPherson lacked any intent or expectation that her private com-
ment to her boyfriend would ever be shared or acted upon by someone 
else.312 
 Conversely, public employees engaging in expressive activities out-
side of work and off duty may still be acting in an employee capacity in cer-
tain circumstances.  For the purposes of this framework, even when not 
speaking on matters directly related to his employment, if an educator seeks 
to link his expression to his professional life, he may be functioning in the 
capacity of an employee and not as a citizen.  City of San Diego v. Roe is 
illustrative in this regard.  The Court noted that Roe had “t[aken] deliberate 
steps to link his videos and other wares to his police work, all in a way injuri-
ous to his employer.”313  Roe’s identity as a police officer was integral to the 
central message of his speech.  Though he was not acting pursuant to job 
duties, the steps he took to link the content of his speech to his status as a 
police officer caused him to cross over into the capacity of a police officer.  
In Craig v. Rich Township High School District 227, the Fourth Circuit took 
into account that Bryan Craig had repeatedly referenced his counseling activi-
ties at Rich Central High School to bolster his credentials as a relationship 
expert.314 
In analyzing whether private interest speech is spoken from the capacity 
of an employee, one must consider the content, form, and context to discover 
any nexus between the employee speech and the workplace.  The following 
questions may be helpful: 
 
 
 311. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 393 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 312. Id. 
 313. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81. 
 314. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
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 Did the speaker make attempts to present himself as a school/district 
employee or as a professional educator in general? 
 
 Did the speaker take steps to make it more likely that members of the 
school community (students/parents/colleagues/administrators) were 
exposed to his speech? 
 
 Did the speaker gain (or seek to gain) greater authority/credibility for 
readers/listeners by virtue of his professional experience or employ-
ment? 
 
 Did the speaker’s expression contain information to which he would 
not otherwise have had access if not for his status as an employee? 
 
 Did the speaker express himself on a matter that pertained directly to 
his work or employer? 
 
If there is an affirmative answer to one or more of these questions, then an 
argument can be made that the speaker was acting within his capacity as an 
employee.  His expression would qualify as employee speech on a matter of 
private concern, unprotected under Connick and therefore not eligible for the 
Pickering balancing test.  This type of speech would include complaints 
about the job or working conditions that do not rise to the level of public con-
cern.  This might also include speech about superiors, colleagues, or students 
that a school administrator may find objectionable, so long as it does not rise 
to a level of public concern. 
If the preceding questions produce only negative answers, then the em-
ployee’s “private” speech was likely made in his capacity as a private citizen.  
Even though this speech touches on a matter of private interest, it should be 
afforded First Amendment protection subject to the Pickering balancing test.  
Trust, confidence, and respect from students and parents within the communi-
ty are essential if an educator is to function effectively in the job.  When edu-
cator speech undermines that trust, it is likely to erode his effectiveness as an 
educator, and in turn, damage institutional efficacy.  Further, because educa-
tors work with children who may be easily influenced, the role-modeling 
function of the job is a critical consideration.  Even purely private speech, if 
seen or heard by parents or students, could substantially disrupt school or 
employee functions.  For these reasons, at least in the case of the public edu-
cator, even purely private speech should be subjected to balancing under 
Pickering. 
D.  The Pickering Balancing Questions 
Step four of the process involves analyzing the speech under Pickering.  
Any speech made by an educator in the capacity as a citizen, whether on a 
public concern or a private interest, should be balanced under Pickering.  The 
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Pickering balancing questions (see Table 2 on page 89) are a set of considera-
tions that would allow school administrators to effectively balance their inter-
ests as employers and educators against the employees’ First Amendment 
rights.  The questions offer school administrators a concrete template for con-
sidering the impact of a specific employee speech sample on institutional 
efficacy.  Affirmative answers to any of these questions suggest that a school 
district would be justified in taking adverse employment action against an 
employee.  If a school administrator cannot answer at least one of the Picker-
ing questions affirmatively, then the employee’s speech should not provide 
the basis for a negative employment decision. 
The case review suggests that, at least in the educational setting, speech 
that could be categorized as racist or sexist is not only likely to cause the 
community to question the fitness of the employee to continue to function 
effectively in the job, but is also likely to actually impair the ability of the 
employee to perform effectively.315  Further, an employee who disparages 
supervisors, students, or colleagues online may damage working relationships 
to the point that he can no longer be effective in his job.316 
In review, the proposed model involves four essential steps.  The first 
step is determining whether the speech was uttered pursuant to the educator’s 
job duties, rendering it ineligible for First Amendment protection.  If the 
speech was not pursuant to job duties, then the analysis proceeds to step two, 
which is determining whether the speech touched on an inherent public con-
cern.  If so, then the speaker was acting in the capacity of a private citizen and 
is protected by the First Amendment and would advance to step four – the 
Pickering questions.  If not, then we proceed to the third step, in which we 
evaluate whether or not the speaker acted in his capacity as an employee 
when he spoke.  If so, then the speech is employee speech on a matter of pri-
vate interest and is not protected.  If not, then it is protected private citizen 
speech that will be evaluated under Pickering.  The model will require school 
administrators to evaluate whether or not the employee’s speech has disrupt-
ed institutional efficacy, but this will not be an onerous task.  The time and 
consideration required seems to be nothing more than what a fair-minded 
employer should be doing anyway.  Table 2 on page 89 summarizes the pro-
posed framework. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
School administrators are caught in a difficult position when one of their 
employees engages in controversial speech that goes viral.  They must respect 
 
 315. See Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301–02 (N.D. Ga. 2014); 
Czaplinksi v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS), 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 38349, at *1–2, *9–10 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015); Craig, 736 F.3d at 1120. 
 316. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2009), amend-
ed (Aug. 27, 2009); Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 475–76 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
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the First Amendment rights of their employees while still responding to the 
needs of the school system and community.  The pace of advances in com-
munication technology and the lack of clear Supreme Court precedent make it 
difficult for school administrators to walk that fine line.  Not only is it confus-
ing to school leaders, but school employees also lack clarity about what is 
and is not acceptable in terms of online expressive conduct.  Adopting this 
approach to evaluating teacher speech cases would provide much needed 
clarity for school administrators and teachers alike, as well as a legally defen-
sible framework that would advance teacher expression rights while still rec-
ognizing the state’s legitimate interest as both an employer and educator. 
This process provides employees with more expansive First Amendment 
rights than the existing laws require, particularly in those contextual circuits.  
Under the proposed model, (1) an educator who expresses himself as a citizen 
would have his speech analyzed under Pickering, even when the expression 
does not address a matter of public concern; (2) administrators would retain 
broad leeway to discipline employees for disruptive speech; and (3) school 
districts would routinely place themselves in more defensible positions. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FEDERAL CASE LAW ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
AND INTERNET SPEECH 














Failed – undermined 
workplace relation-








aging comments about 
students. 
Yes. Failed – invective 





Deputy sheriffs “liked” 
and made supportive 
comments on Facebook 
page of boss’s political 
opponent. 
Yes. Passed – no showing 









High school guidance 
counselor and girls coach 
self-published sexually 
explicit self-help book 
for women. 
Yes. Failed – speech that 
objectified females 
would justifiably 
erode confidence and 
trust in employee as 
counselor. 
Czaplinski 
v. Board of 
Education 
of the City 
of Vine-
land321 
School security guard 
posted about “black 
thugs” involved in shoot-
ing of Philadelphia police 
officer. 
Yes. Failed – comment 
impeded ability to do 
daily duties/cast 







on Facebook, disparaging 
gun control and liberals.  





Failed – comment 
could undermine 
loyalty, discipline, 
and good working 
 
317. Richerson v. Beckon, No. 08-35310, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19327 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 27, 2009). 
318. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
319. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013). 
320. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013). 
321. Czaplinski v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS), 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015). 
322. Buker v. Howard Cty., No. MJG-13-3046, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68763 
(D. Md. May 27, 2015). 
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remove comment, he 








v. City of 
Peters-
burg323 
Two police officers en-
gaged in Facebook ex-
change expressing disap-








due to lack of evi-







County animal shelter 
director put objectionable 
posts on official animal 
shelter Facebook page, 





Deputy police chief post-
ed rebel flag and called 
for second revolution the 
morning after President 
Obama’s re-election. 
Yes. Failed – speech 
communicated racist 
ideology that under-
mined public trust 





Employee in county at-
torney’s office “liked” 
Facebook post that was 
highly critical of findings 
clearing local police of-
ficers in the shooting of a 
family member. 




torney, local police, 






Veteran police officer 
criticized chief’s decision 
not to send representative 
to officer funeral in 
neighboring city. 
No. N/A – but would 
have failed if speech 
had been deemed on 
public concern, due 





Public employee made 
sympathetic remark on 
Facebook regarding fired 
co-workers. 
Yes. Passed – employer 
showed no evidence 
of disruption. 
 
323. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 106 F. Supp. 3d 744 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
324. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, No. 1:13CV135, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
146041 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014). 
325. Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
326. Vincent v. Story Cty., No. 4:12-cv-00157-RAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
184287 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 14, 2014). 
327. Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 985 F. Supp. 2d 808 (N.D. Miss. 2013). 
328. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV99215 JLH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
126665 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011). 
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propriately with students 





no role in 
decision to 
dismiss. 
N/A – but would 
have failed; disrup-
tion would have out-
weighed First 






Student teacher posted 
“drunken pirate” picture 




329. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). 
330. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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TABLE 2: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF EDUCATOR SPEECH 
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